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Abstract
The author examines the role of collateral in an environment where lenders and borrowers possess
identical information and similar beliefs about its future value. Using option-pricing techniques,
he shows that a secured loan contract is equivalent to a regular bond and an embedded option to
the borrower to default. He ﬁnds that the lender will not advance to the borrower a loan that
exceeds the market value of the collateral, and that the supply of loans increases with a rise in the
market value of the collateral. Increases in the volatility of the value of the collateral, interest rate,
and dividend rate of the collateral independently depress the loan supply. The author also derives
the cost of a third-party guarantee of a loan and an implied risk premium.
JEL classiﬁcation: E51, E53, G11, G12, G13
Bank classiﬁcation: Credit and credit aggregates; Economic models
Résumé
L’auteur étudie le rôle des garanties dans un contexte où prêteurs et emprunteurs ont la même
information et partagent des attentes semblables quant à la valeur future des garanties. À l’aide de
techniques d’évaluation des options, il montre qu’un prêt assorti d’une garantie équivaut à une
obligation ordinaire qui comporte une option de défaut de paiement de la part de l’emprunteur.
L’auteur constate que les prêteurs ne sont pas disposés à octroyer des prêts d’un montant supérieur
à la valeur marchande des garanties et qu’une hausse de cette dernière a pour effet d’accroître
l’offre de prêts. À l’inverse, une augmentation de la volatilité de la valeur des garanties, du taux
d’intérêt ou du taux de dividende des titres donnés en garantie a une incidence négative sur l’offre
de prêts. L’auteur élabore également des formules permettant d’évaluer le coût d’une garantie de
prêt offerte par un tiers et la prime de risque implicite.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E51, E53, G11, G12, G13
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Crédit et agrégats du crédit; Modèles économiques1
1. Introduction
Loan contracts generally require that borrowers post assets that can be taken over by lenders
should the borrowers default on the promised payments. An explanation for such contractual
arrangements is that borrowers and lenders have asymmetric information about the project that
the loan is ﬁnancing: because borrowers appear to know more about the project than the lender,
the borrowers’ evaluation of the project tends to be higher than that of the lenders. According to a
strand of the literature, collateral in loan agreements in this environment acts as a disincentive for
borrowers to default.
Another strand of the literature argues that collateral plays an important role in loan negotiations
even when borrowers and lenders have the same information but differ in beliefs. In this
environment, collateral signals information to the lender about the riskiness and/or prospects of
the project the loan is needed to ﬁnance. Borrowers provide collateral as a way of sorting
themselves out by risk class if lenders believe that the level of secured loan indicates the project’s
proﬁtability. Lenders may have such beliefs because secured debt is costly for borrowers whose
projects are of low quality.
The focus of this paper is to re-examine the role of collateral in a loan contract. Our approach
differs from the literature in that both lenders and borrowers have the same information and
identical beliefs regarding the prospects of the project. Hence, the reason for credit rationing is
not asymmetric information, a common rationale used in the literature to motivate the credit
market. In our analysis, collateral can be assets used in the project or outside assets owned by the
borrower that are not part of the project. Although the initial value of the collateral is known to the
transactors of the loan contract, the future value is uncertain. Both the lender and borrower agree
on the probability distribution of the future value of the collateral. In addition, we show that for
every secured loan contract there is an embedded option value that allows the borrower to
strategically choose when to default.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the literature on the role of collateral
in loan agreements. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 discusses the cost of a loan that is
guaranteed by a third party, and derives an expression for the implied risk premium embedded in
the loan contract. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.2
2. The Role of Collateral in Credit Markets
Along with the interest rate level, collateral plays an important role in credit markets.1 Examining
the data in the United Kingdom, Black, de Meza, and Jeffreys (1996) ﬁnd that the value of
collateral posted by small businesses exceeds the value of loans. Leeth and Scott (1989) and
Berger and Udell (1990) ﬁnd that most commercial loan agreements require collateral as security.
Black, de Meza, and Jeffreys (1996) also ﬁnd that the size of collateral impedes the creation of
small businesses. All these observations indicate that collateral plays an important role in the
pricing of credit instruments.
There are two types of collateral. The ﬁrst is called inside collateral, in which the borrower uses
an asset in the project to be ﬁnanced as collateral; if there is a default, the lender takes possession
of the project. The second type is called outside collateral: assets not used in the project are posted
as collateral.
Why do lenders demand collateral from borrowers? In the literature, asymmetric information on
projects is used as a plausible explanation for the use of collateral, as well as for the existence of
imperfections in the credit markets. Banks and entrepreneurs usually have divergent evaluations
of projects. Entrepreneurs tend to evaluate projects more highly than creditors do. Bester (1985),
Besanko and Thakor (1987), and Chan and Kanatas (1985) suggest that, in credit markets with
moral hazard or adverse selection, outside collateral serves as an incentive, or screening device.
They argue that outside collateral increases the punishment for default. Bester (1994) suggests
that, if a borrower can choose from a variety of risky projects, then collateral ensures that low-risk
projects will be chosen. In the case of adverse selection, lenders could offer a menu of contracts
that rank loan applicants according to the riskiness of projects. In this scenario, Bester (1994)
reports that entrepreneurs with a low probability of default reveal themselves by posting collateral
that is unattractive to high-risk borrowers.
Bester (1994) also suggests that collateral is posted by borrowers when there is asymmetric
information with costly state veriﬁcation. He explains this proposition by considering a model of
borrowing and lending in which an entrepreneur needs to raise capital for a risky project, the
outcome of which cannot be observed by the lender. Bester shows that, within this framework, an
optimal loan contract must have the commitment of the lender to impose bankruptcy and liquidate
some or all of the entrepreneur’s remaining assets in the project in the event of default. The
bankruptcy clause acts as a payment incentive for the entrepreneur. In other words, the lender
1. The discussion in this section is heavily inﬂuenced by Coco (2000).3
enforces truth-telling behaviour by threatening to impose bankruptcy on the defaulting
entrepreneur.
Bester (1994) also examines the case in which the lender cannot precommit to impose bankruptcy
on defaulting entrepreneurs. He suggests that outside collateral will weaken the entrepreneurs’
incentive to default on debt payments and allow the lenders to renegotiate a larger proportion of
loans, avoiding some suboptimal assets transfer. Loan agreements are renegotiated when
bankruptcy is inefﬁcient for both parties. For example, in the face of prohibitive liquidation costs,
lenders are better off renegotiating the contract to prevent default. The rewriting of loan contracts,
which may include partial debt forgiveness, could bring about moral hazard. Entrepreneurs,
knowing that there is a chance of debt forgiveness, may opt to default even in good states of the
world in an attempt to renegotiate the repayment. To discourage this behaviour, lenders could ask
for outside collateral against the loan. Bester argues that the larger the size of the collateral, the
more inclined the lenders are to believe that the project return is low when borrowers decide to
default. Lenders therefore ﬁnd the option of partial debt forgiveness more proﬁtable than taking
over the project. Thus, under this framework, outside collateral helps minimize the cost of
bankruptcy.
The use of collateral imposes some economic costs. Chan and Kanatas (1985) suggest that these
include legal documentation, monitoring and/or insurance costs, and the implicit costs to the
borrower for being forced to relinquish discretionary use of the collateralized asset. Barro (1976)
also points out that, during bankruptcy procedures, banks may incur the costs of collecting and
marketing the collateralized asset. Collateralized assets may be intrinsically more valuable to the
borrower than the lender. For example, small businesses commonly use their own homes as
collateral against bank loans. The value of the home to the borrower is generally larger than its
market value. Selling the asset therefore involves a welfare loss.
It is very clear that collateral plays an important role in determining the price of a credit
instrument. In section 3, we use asset-pricing techniques to formally examine the role of collateral
in the valuation of a standard loan contract.
3. A Simple Model for Pricing a Loan Contract
In this section, we apply option-pricing techniques to examine the importance of collateral in the
pricing of credit instruments. The loan contract we consider has the following features. A
borrower takes a loan, which is secured with collateral. The loan contract is a one-time contract,
where the borrower pays back the loan at an agreed date. Under the contract agreement, the lender4
takes possession of the collateral if the borrower defaults on the payment. We assume that,
although the future value is unknown, the initial market value of the collateral is known to the
lender and the borrower. Under this assumption, the borrower will rationally default at any time
during the contract period if the market value of the collateral is less than the outstanding balance
of the loan.
Under the arrangement and the assumptions of the loan contract, if the principal of the loan is F
and the market value of the collateral is Q, then the expected value of the loan to the lender at the
end of the contract is:
Min[F, Q]. (1)
We make a further assumption that the collateral could be either inside or outside assets. Also, for
simplicity, we assume that embedded in F are all the necessary costs incurred by the borrower
upon defaulting on the loan agreement.2
In addition to the above assumption, we shall make the usual assumptions for modelling
continuous-time asset-pricing models: (i) assets are traded in a frictionless or perfect market,
where there are no taxes, transactions costs, or short sale restrictions, and all assets are perfectly
divisible; (ii) trading of assets is done continuously; and (iii) the value of the collateral follows a
continuous-time diffusion process. Interest rates are also assumed to be deterministic.3
To distinguish our model from those based on asymmetric information, we assume that lenders
and borrowers have the same information on, and identical beliefs in, the prospects for the project.
Both therefore agree on the diffusion process followed by the value of the collateral. Thus, if Q(t)
is the market value of the collateral, then its stochastic process is of the form:
, (2)
where  is a standard Brownian motion, with mean zero and variance dt. In equation (2), we
have assumed that the bearer of the collateral receives dividend or service ﬂow at a constant rate,
d. The borrower continues to receive the dividend until such time that they default, after which it
goes to the lender. The diffusion part (the second part on the right-hand side) of equation (2)
makes the instantaneous rate of appreciation of the collateral uncertain. Hence, the expected rate
of appreciation of the collateral is .
2. These costs may include bankruptcy, legal, and reputation costs.
3. This assumption is veryrestrictive. Incorporating a stochastic interest rateinto the model, however,
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3.1 Valuation of the loan contract
Given the value of the collateral, Q, let the value of the secured loan at any time be L(Q, t). Then,
applying Ito’s lemma, the drift and the diffusion of the loan are given as:
, (3)





Proposition 1: The partial differential equation governing the loan is
. (7)
Proof:
We use standard arbitrage arguments common in the options-pricing literature. Consider forming
a portfolio, the value of which is H, by investing w in the collateral asset and (1 - w) in the loan.
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An investment position of  units in the collateral asset and  in the
loan would be riskless. For there to be no arbitrage proﬁts, the instantaneous return on the
portfolio must be equal to that of a risk-free asset, r. Thus:
. (12)
Equating equation (12) with the drift term of equation (9), with the substitution of w, we have:
. (13)
Substituting equations (5) and (6) into equation (13) and rearranging yields the differential
equation that governs the loan contract (equation (7)).
An intuitive explanation in the ﬁnance literature for the differential equation that summarizes the
loan contract is as follows. The ﬁrst term on the left-hand side of equation (7) captures Jensen’s
inequality effect coming from the variance of the value of the collateral. The second term
represents the risk-adjusted expected drift of the value of the collateral. The third term reﬂects the
shrinking time-to-maturity. The last term represents the net ﬂows to the lender.
Proposition 2: Under the set of assumptions given earlier, the value of the loan is:
, (14)
where P(Q, F, t) is a European put option on the collateral asset, Q, with constant dividend dQ
and an exercise price equal to the principal payment, F. The value of the put option is
, (15)
where



























LQt , () Fe
rt – PQFt ,, () – =
PQFt ,, () Fe
rt – Nd 1 ()Qe
dt – Nd 2 () – =7
,
,
and N(.) is the cumulative normal distribution function.
Proof:
Begin by rewriting equation (1) as:
Min[F, Q] = F - max[0, F-Q]. (16)
Under the set of assumptions given earlier, equation (16) suggests that the value of the loan is
equivalent to a regular bond (having a face value of F and no coupon payments) and a short
position on a European put option on the collateral, with the time left to maturity t (T-t) and the
strike price equal to the ﬁnal payment of the loan, which by our assumption is the principal, F.
The ﬁrst term of equation (14) corresponds to the present value of a bond. The put value option
follows from Atta-Mensah (1992), Merton (1973), and Geske (1979). Lastly, by performing the
relevant differentiations, we ﬁnd that equations (14) and (15) correspond to equation (7), the
stochastic partial differential.
From propositions 1 and 2, we observe that the value of the collateral plays an important role in
the evaluation of loan contracts. Proposition 2 clearly shows that the value of the loan is a function
of the value of the collateral. In section 3.2, we will examine how the underlying parameters of
the model affect the supply of credit.
3.2 Factors inﬂuencing the supply of credit
In this section, we attempt to enhance our understanding of the factors that affect the terms and
conditions of credit, and the possible role those factors play in the propagation of the business
cycle.
Proposition 3: The supply of loans will rise with the increase in the value of collateral.
Proof:
Differentiating equation (14) with respect to Q and using equation (A10) in Appendix A:
d1
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Remarks: The result corroborates conventional wisdom, which suggests that the higher the value
of the collateral, the greater the size of the loan, given the same level of project risk. Furthermore,
if net worth is a proxy for collateral, then the result supports the view that ﬁrms face a credit
squeeze when their net worth falls in value. Moreover, the more valuable the collateral, the less
chance the borrower will default on the loan, since the option value falls with the rise in the value
of the collateral.
Proposition 4: The supply of loans falls as the value of the collateral becomes more volatile.
Proof:
Differentiating equation (14) with respect to the variance of Q, , and using equation (A16) in
Appendix A:
. (18)
Remarks: The result demonstrates that lenders are less inclined to give out loans that are secured
with very volatile collateral. The increase in the volatility of the collateral’s value increases the
value of the put option attached to the loan, because a put call has no downside risk, since the
value of the put is zero irrespective of how far it ﬁnishes out of the money. Hence, an increase in
the volatility of the collateral increases the chances that the put option will expire in the money.
The rise in the value of the collateral, following the increase in the volatility of the collateral, also
increases the chances of loan default. This explains why certain intermediaries will not accept
securities as collateral.
Proposition 5: The supply of loans is an increasing function of the principal, F.
Proof:
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Remarks: Proposition 5 needs no further explanation, because one would intuitively expect the
supply of loans to rise with the rise in the principal value.
Proposition 6: A tightening of monetary policy has a negative impact on the supply of loans.
Proof:
Differentiating equation (14) with respect to the interest rate, r, and using equation (A24):
, (20)
since .
Remarks: The result shows that the raising of interest rates leads to a fall in the supply of loans.
The rationale behind this result is that the rise in interest rates reduces the present values of the
bond component of the loan and the exercise price of the put option, combining to depress the
loan supply. The results may also explain why central banks tend to lower interest rates when the
terms and conditions for borrowing are tight, especially during a downturn of the business cycle.
Proposition 7: The rise in the dividend rate on the collateral has an adverse effect on the supply of
loans.
Proof:
Differentiating equation (14) with respect to the dividend rate, d, and using equation (A26):
. (21)
Remarks: An intuitive explanation of this result is that the rise in the dividend rate enhances the
value of the put option. With the value of the put option rising, the chance of default also goes up,
leading the lenders to cut back the supply of loans.
Proposition 8: The term-to-maturity date has an ambiguous effect on the supply of loans.
Proof:
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Clearly, the sign for equation (22) is indeterminate.
Remarks: This result indicates that lenders are indifferent between offering short- and long-term
loan contracts.
Proposition 9: The maximum size of a loan the lender will advance to the borrower will not
exceed the value of the collateral. Thus:
. (23)
Proof:
Taking the limit of  in equation (14) as  gives the result. Note that if the collateral
yields no dividends (or d = 0), then the maximum amount of loan offered is Q.
Remarks: The results state that a rational lender will advance to a borrower an amount not
exceeding the market value of the collateral. This places a ceiling on the loan supply. For
example, a borrower that holds a collateral that pays a dividend rate of 20 per cent per year, and
needs a loan that matures in 10 years, will receive from a rational lender a maximum 14 per cent
of the current market value of the collateral, no matter how high an interest rate the borrower is
prepared to pay.
4. Loan Guarantee and Risk Premium
In section 3, we derived an expression for the valuation of a loan contract secured with collateral.
In this section, we examine the impact of a third party that guarantees to pay the lender should the
borrower default. In addition, we derive an expression for the implied risk premium embedded in
the loan contract.
4.1 The cost of a loan guarantee
Let us consider a case in which there is a third party that guarantees to pay the lender should the
borrower default.4 This contract, between the borrower and the guarantor, would require that the
borrower surrender the collateral to the guarantor in the event of a loan default. Note that the
collateral could be the assets of the borrower or the value of the project being ﬁnanced with the
loan.
4. The discussion in this section is based on Merton (1977).
L Q t , () Qe
dt – £
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Before we provide the pricing formula for the cost of the guarantee, we analyze the pay-offs under
various states of the world. On the maturity date of the loan, if the value of the collateral, Q,
exceeds the promised payment of the loan, F, then the borrower pays the lender, F, and keeps Q -
F. On the other hand, if the value of the collateral, Q, is less than the promised payment of the
loan, F, the third party pays the lender F and takes a loss of F - Q, with the borrower receiving
nothing.
Proposition 10: The cost of the loan guarantee is equivalent to a European put option, the
underlying asset of which is Q and the exercise price F.
Proof:
The contractual arrangement suggests that, at the maturity date, the lender will receive the
promised payment, F, regardless of the state of the world. Thus, to the lender the loan is riskless.
The net receipt for the borrower is max(0, Q - F), with or without a guarantee. The net receipt to
the guarantor is min(0, Q - F), which is non-positive. As a result of the guarantee, the borrower
receives an additional cash inﬂow of -min(0, Q - F), or max(0, F - Q). Hence, if G(t) is the value
of the guarantee to the borrower, then
G(0) = max(0, F - Q), (24)
which is equivalent to a put option. Equation (15) gives the exact formula for evaluating the
option.
4.2 Risk premium
In this section, we attempt to derive an expression for the risk premium embedded in the loan
contract. To a lender, a loan that is guaranteed by the borrower is riskless. The difference between
the yield on a loan that is not guaranteed and one that is guaranteed is a measure of the risk
premium.
Proposition 11: The risk premium embedded in a loan contract is a function of the ratio of the cost
of the loan guarantee and the present value of the promised payment.
Proof:
Let y(t) be the implied yield of the debt, F, when there is no guarantee, implying that the present
value of the debt is Fexp(-y(t)t). With the loan guaranteed, the lender is assured F, which is either
paid by the borrower or the guarantor. The present value of the guaranteed loan is Fexp(-r(t)t),
where r(t) is the riskless rate of return. In the absence of arbitrage opportunities, we should
expect:12
, (25)
from which the implied risk premium is derived as:
. (26)
Equation (26) gives an expression for the implied risk premium.
4.2.1 Factors inﬂuencing the risk premium
In section 3, we showed that the value of the collateral plays an important part in the
determination of a loan contract. In this section, we examine factors that inﬂuence the risk
premium.
Proposition 12: The risk premium is negatively correlated with the value of the collateral.
Proof:
Differentiate equation (26) with respect to Q:
, (27)
since  and .
Remarks: An explanation for this result is that an appreciation in the value of the collateral leads
to a lesser chance of the borrower defaulting on the promised payment of the loan. The risk
premium falls, reﬂecting the reduced risk of default.
Proposition 13: The risk premium rises as the value of the collateral becomes more volatile.
Proof:
Differentiate equation (26) with respect to sq:
, (28)
since  and .
G t () Fe
yt – + Fe
rt – =
P yr – 1
t
--- 1 G t ()
Fe
rt – ------------- – èø













Nd 2 ()0 £ – =














N¢ d2 ()0 ³ =
N¢ d2 ()0 ³ G t () Fe
rt – <13
Remarks: An increase in the volatility of the value of the collateral increases the option-value
component of the loan. Consequently, the risk of default by the borrower rises, resulting in the rise
in the risk premium.
Proposition 14: The impact of monetary policy on the risk premium is indeterminate.
Proof:
Differentiate equation (26) with respect to r:
. (29)
Remarks: The results indicate that the impact of monetary policy on the risk premium is
indeterminate. A common view held by market analysts is that an expansionary monetary policy
will help reduce risky spreads. Our result, however, indicates that the impact of monetary policy
on the risky spread cannot be ascertained.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the role of collateral in an environment where lenders and
borrowers possess identical information and similar beliefs about its future value. We have
brought together two views in the literature: one argues that collateral is needed in loan contracts
because of asymmetric information between the lender and borrower, and the second examines
the role of collateral in an environment where lenders and borrowers have identical information
but different beliefs about the future value of the collateral.
Using option-pricing techniques, we have shown that a secured loan contract is equivalent to a
regular bond and an embedded option to the borrower to default. Our results have shown that the
lender will not advance to the borrower a loan that exceeds the market value of the collateral. In
addition, we have found that the supply of loans increases with a rise in the market value of the
collateral. Increases in the volatility of the value of the collateral, interest rate, and dividend rate
of the collateral independently depress the loan supply. We have also derived the cost of a third-
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Appendix A: Properties of the Put Option
A1. The value of the put option






and N(.) is the cumulative normal distribution function.
We now turn to the sensitivity of the value of the put to the parameters.
A2. The change of the price of the collateral on the put option
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. (A15)
As previously shown, the term in the square bracket on the right-hand side of equation (A15)
reduces to zero. This implies that:
. (A16)
A4. The change of the principal on the put option value
Differentiate the put option value with respect to F:
, (A17)
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A5. The change of the interest rate on the put option value




From the previous section, the second term on the right-hand side is zero. Hence,
. (A24)
A6. The change of the dividend rate on the put option value
Differentiate with respect to d:
. (A25)
Following the previous sections, it can easily be shown that
. (A26)
A7. The change of the term to maturity on the put option value
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Substituting A and B and manipulating further,
(A30)
With the terms in the square brackets equal to zero,
. (A31)
Clearly, the sign of equation (A31) is indeterminate.
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